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RAFTERY CURVES FOR TENDER PRICE FORECASTING: 
EMPIRICAL PROBABILITIES AND POOLING 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A method is proposed for the empirical derivation of Raftery Curve probabilities from 
forecasted/actual value ratios.  The method is applied to a set of Hong Kong 
construction contract data.  Using the error of predicted ratios as the measure of 
opportunity cost, it is then shown how the method may be used to identify the best 
data poolings amongst subsets. 
 
Keywords: Raftery Curves, tender price forecasts, empirical probabilities, data 
pooling, Hong Kong construction contracts. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Estimates of construction costs are potentially more useful in probabilistic form 
instead of the conventional point estimate.  For estimates obtained by synthesising 
construction activity costs, the Program Review and Evaluation Technique (PERT) 
provides a means of combining probabilistic activity estimates in the form of means 
and ranges.  This has been developed into what has become known as 'range 
estimating' (eg., Knoke et al, 1993, Rowland and Curran, 1995; Curran, 1995, Curran 
and Curran, 1996; Isidore and Back, 1999; Back, 2001).  Raftery (1993) has 
suggested that this could usefully be developed further to show the form (shape) of 
the distribution (termed Raftery Curve) as well as the range.  Skitmore (1996) has 
shown how this might be done parametrically for tender price forecasts, by fitting one 
of the standard probability density functions to the cumulative frequency of the tender 
price forecast/actual values. 
 
In this paper, a method is developed for constructing empirical (nonparametric) 
Raftery Curves for tender price forecasts.  This is applied to a set of Hong Kong 
construction contract data.  Using the error of predicting ratios as the measure of 
opportunity cost, it is then shown how the method may be used to identify the best 
data poolings amongst subsets. 
 
 
RAFTERY CURVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
In its parametric form, Raftery Curve construction involves two major considerations 
(1) the appropriate form of probability density function (pdf), such as the normal, 
lognormal, uniform or beta distribution and (2) the parameter estimates of the pdf, 
such as the mean and variance of the normal distribution or the minimum and 
maximum of the uniform distribution.  In the tender price forecasting field, most of 
the empirical research to date has concentrated on (2).  Ashworth and Skitmore 
(1983), Skitmore (1991) and Gunner and Skitmore (1999) have provided summaries 
of many of these previous studies in terms of bias and consistency - bias being the 
average of differences between actual bid prices (usually lowest tender price) and 
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forecasts, and consistency being the degree of variation around this average.  The only 
tests for an appropriate pdf have been on the normal distribution as a check on the 
reasonableness of assumptions involved in regression analyses (eg., Gunner and 
Skitmore, 1999). 
 
Also of relevance is the extensive research that has been carried out in the 
development of bidding models.  In this case, as the construction contract bidders are 
trying  to provide the lowest bid (tender), each bid can be assumed to be equivalent to 
a tender price forecast.  Most commonly, the total bid price for each tenderer has been 
treated as a random variable from some well-known density function such as uniform 
(e.g. Cauwelaert and Heynig, 1978, Fine and Hackemar, 1970, Grinyer and Whittaker, 
1973, Whittaker, 1970), normal (Cauwelaert and Heynig, 1978, McCaffer, 1976, 
Mitchell, 1977, Morrison and Stevens, 1980), lognormal (Brown, 1966, Klein, 1976, 
Skitmore, 1991, Weverbergh, 1982); gamma (Friedman, 1956), Weibull (Oren and 
Rothkopf, 1975) or just “positively skewed” (Beeston, 1974, McCaffer and Pettitt, 
1976, Park, 1966).  Often, tenderers are assumed to be homogeneous, which allows all 
bids to be regarded as coming from the same pdf.  Very little of this work has 
involved model fitting though.  McCaffer and Pettitt (1976), assuming homogeneity,  
found a normal distribution to be a better fit for their data than a uniform distribution.  
Skitmore (1991), however, found his data to be heterogeneous, with individual 
bidders following a three-parameter lognormal distribution.  More recently, Skitmore 
(2001), assuming homogeneity, has fitted a two parameter lognormal (and normal) 
pdf to bidding data with high outliers removed. 
 
A further issue concerns the data sampling used for curve fitting.  To objectively 
construct a Raftery Curve for a future contract, the constructor is compelled to use a 
set of data for a sample of completed contracts.  Beeston (1974) has urged the use of 
as large a sample as possible for analysis in order to reduce the effects of sampling 
bias.  However, as originally pointed out by Flanagan (1980), this produces a 
paradoxical situation.  Ideally, the constructor would use a sample of similar contracts 
to the future contract, ie., of similar functional and technological type, size, 
geographical location, etc.  The assumption is that the closer the characteristics of the 
sample match the future contract, the better the ensuing Raftery Curve will be.  
However, the closer the sample is made to match the future contract, the smaller the 
sample becomes, and the greater become the sampling bias involved in curve fitting.  
Clearly, the solution to this dilemma is to somehow trade-off the biases created by 
using too small a sample with the biases created by using an unrepresentative sample. 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
Empirical probabilities are derived by rank ordering the forecast/tender price ratios 
and assigning the probability, pi, to the ith ratio, ri (i=1,...,n): 
 
n
i
n
ipi
2
−=  (1) 
 
Fig 1 shows a step plot of the results of this operation applied to a subset of small 
Hong Kong building contracts (see Appendix A for details of the whole dataset).  By 
joining the points with a straight line, the probability for any ratio can be estimated by 
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interpolation (extrapolation at the ends of the curve) between the two straddling 
points.  Thus, the associated probability for a ratio of 0.90 is interpolated as around 
0.054 (Fig 2).  Similarly, the ratio can be estimated for a given probability also by 
interpolation/extrapolation, a probability of 0.05 occurring where the ratio value is 
approximately 0.89. 
 
 
THE POOLING PROBLEM 
 
Within-pooling opportunity cost 
 
The pooling problem arises because the sample sizes are finite.  Clearly, with an 
infinite sample size of identical contracts, the empirical probabilities will be exact for 
all ratio values.  As the sample size reduces, the average gap between each 
observation increases.  One way to measure the effect of this is to leave out an 
observation and see how the predictions of the model change.  Fig 2 shows the 
situation.  Here we leave out the third lowest ratio, which has a value of 0.9721 
(p=0.0625).  Rank ordering the remaining n-1 ratios and recalculating the 
probabilities produces the result shown in Fig 3.  This shows the new curve marked 
with blobs, in contrast with the original curve marked with stars.  The probability of 
0.0625 now points to an interpolated ratio of 0.9488, a difference of 0.9721-
0.9488=0.0216. 
 
Now in practice, it is likely that the Raftery Curve user will want to know the value 
above or below the forecast that coincides some probability.  For instance, a client 
might want to know beyond what percentage above or below the forecast there is little 
or no chance (eg., 1 in 20 or a probability of 0.05) of a bid occurring.  The identical 
situation occurs when a bidder is interested in knowing below what percentage of the 
(cost estimate) forecast there is little or no chance of the lowest bid occurring.  The 
point of interest in both situations is not so much how good is the probability 
prediction for a given percentage deviation from the forecast, but how good is the 
predicted percentage deviation for a given probability.  Also, the goodness of the 
percentage deviation prediction is an important issue for the client or bidder.  Let us 
say that, for both client and bidder, they need to know the percentage deviation from 
the forecast that accords with a probability of 0.05, ie., there is a probability of  0.05 
the lowest bid will be less than the percentage stated.  Imagine this percentage is 
predicted to be 2 percent.  The client allows for this in the annual budget for all 
projects in the form of the expected saving 2x0.05=0.10 percent.  Now, if the true 
percentage for a probability of 0.05 is actually 10 instead of 2 percent, this means that 
the expected saving should have been 10x0.05=0.50 percent instead of 0.10 percent.  
For large client organisations, this can result in a considerable dollar underspend.  The 
same argument applies in the reverse case where an overspend may result.  For 
bidders, such poor predictions can result in contracts lost (or worse) through applying 
excessively high mark-up values or the acquisition unprofitable contracts by bidding 
too low.  Therefore, the difference between the predicted and actual percentage 
deviation from the forecast, for a given probability, represents an opportunity cost for 
both client and bidder users.  Whether this opportunity cost is symmetrical (ie., the 
pain is the same for a given overspend as it is for the same amount of underspend) and 
a linear function of the goodness of the percentage deviation prediction (ie, twice the 
overspend means twice the pain) is an empirical issue yet to be determined (and may 
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depend on the individual circumstances involved).  It does seem, however, reasonable 
to assume at this stage a one to one correspondence between opportunity cost and the 
error of the deviation prediction. 
 
In terms of the analysis so far then, the difference between the original ratio value for 
observation 3 and its predicted value for the same probability once it is omitted from 
the dataset is the opportunity loss.  That is, the difference 0.0216 is the opportunity 
loss.  Now, as we have assumed symmetry, there is no need to distinguish between 
positive and negative values of these differences.  We can, therefore, simply sum the 
absolute (unsigned) values of these differences for the whole of the dataset as we 
continue to omit each observation in turn (with replacement).  Table 1 summarises the 
results of doing this for each of the 40 small cfa valued contracts.  The first column 
gives the contract sequence number, the second the ratio (R), the third the associated 
probability (p), the fourth is the predicted ratio for that p value once that contract is 
removed, the sixth column gives the difference between the original R and the 
predicted R and the last column gives its absolute value.  Thus, contract 13, which is 
the third of the small cfa contracts shows the results in the above example.  The last 
three rows provide the totals, means and standard deviations for the column values.  
Thus for the 40 contracts involved in this subgroup, the mean value of the ratios is 
1.1474 - indicating that these contracts have been overestimated by an average of 
14.74 percent - with a standard deviation of 16.48 percent (a coefficient of variation 
of 14.36 percent), which is normal for this type of forecast.  The probabilities, as 
expected by virtue of the method of calculation, have a mean of 0.50.  The mean 
value of the predicted ratios is, at 1.1432, slightly less than the mean of the actual 
ratios, indicating a small amount of bias in the predictions.  With a standard deviation 
of 0.1328, the predicted ratios have quite a large reduction in variability than the 
original ratios, but again this is to be expected with the smoothing effect caused by the 
omission of observations.  The mean difference between predicted and actual ratios is 
shown although this is calculable from the means of actual and predicted ratios 
(1.1474-1.1432=0.0042), but the standard deviation of the difference may be a useful 
measure as an alternative to the absolute differences in the event of the true 
opportunity costs involved turning out to a squared, rather than linear, function of the 
actual-predicted ratio differences.  The mean of the last column, 0.0190, provides us 
with our current measure of opportunity loss for this data grouping. 
 
This statistic can easily be computed for any pooling arrangement, provided all the 
data for the subgroup are present.  For example, the results for the combined small, 
medium and large cfa groupings are given in Table 2.  In this case, all the ratios are 
rank ordered and assigned probability values (only those for small cfa contracts are 
shown in Table 2).  Each contracts is again left out in turn and all the remaining 
contracts reassigned probability values, which are then interpolated to obtain the 
predicted ratio values as before (again, only the predicted ratios for the small cfa 
contracts are shown in Table 2).  From this the signed and unsigned differences are 
derived and analysed as before.  The summary statistics in the last three columns 
show the changes produced by the pooling.  In particular, we are interested in the 
mean absolute difference between the actual and predicted ratios.  This is 0.0110 in 
contrast with the 0.0190 recorded for the unpooled data and represents a considerable 
reduction in opportunity cost.  The results for all the possible poolings are 
summarised in Table 4.  This shows the full pooling, as expected, to have the least 
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opportunity cost (0.0110), followed by the small and medium cfa pooling (0.0115) the 
small and large cfa pooling (0.0153) and finally the unpooled version (0.0190). 
 
 
Between-pooling opportunity costs 
 
Different pooling schemes produce different ratio probabilities.  Fig 4 illustrates this.  
The empirical Raftery Curves for the small cfa contracts are shown based on both the 
unpooled small cfa contracts and the fully pooled contracts.  For convenience, we 
shall call these the unpooled curve and pooled curve respectively.  Which curve 
provides the correct probabilities?  Can both be correct? 
 
The answer to this is that both are correct in their own way.  The pooled curve is 
produced by all the data and is therefore appropriate if, for example, the cfa category 
for the future contract is not known.  It follows, therefore, that the unpooled curve will 
be appropriate when the cfa category is known for the future contract.  In practice, it 
is expected that the latter will be the case and therefore the unpooled curve is the 
correct one for the purpose.  This means then that, for a given probability, the ratio 
predicted by the pooled curve is in error by the amount of its difference with the 
equivalent ratio for the unpooled curve.  For example, the third ranked ratio (contract 
13) for the pooled cfa subgroups is 0.9271, with a probability of 0.0620 (Table 2).  
Now, looking at Table 1, it can be seen that this probability is equivalent to a 
predicted ratio for the unpooled curve of between 0.8466 (p=0.0375) and 0.9271 
(p=0.0625).  By linear interpolation, this is a predicted ratio of  0.9255 - an error of 
0.9271-0.9255 = 0.0017 (rounded).  Table 3 columns {3} and {4} shows the results 
for all the small cfa contracts.  Now, again assuming that the opportunity costs are a 
symmetrical and lineal function of this error, we can sum the absolute values of the 
errors over all the ratios in the subset to obtain the opportunity cost involved in using 
the pooled curve instead of the unpooled curve.  In this example, the total is shown at 
the bottom of Table 3 column {4} as 1.7912, with a mean of 0.0448.  This is the 
'between-pooling' opportunity cost. 
 
 
Total opportunity cost 
 
Clearly, the total opportunity cost of using the pooled curve instead of the unpooled 
curve is the sum of the extra opportunity costs involved.  These comprise (1) the 
difference between the within-pooling costs and (2) the between-pooling costs.  These 
are shown in Table 3.  Column {2} provides the difference between the within 
pooling costs and column {4} provides the between pooling costs.  For example, the 
third small cfa contract (contract 13) has an unpooled within-pooling cost of 0.0216 
(Table 1 last column) and a pooled within-pooling cost of 0.0265 (Table 2 last 
column) - a difference of 0.0048 (rounded) (Table 3 column {2}).  To this is added 
the between-pooling cost of 0.0017 (Table 3 column {4}) to give the total opportunity 
cost of 0.0065 (Table 3 column {5}).  The bottom of Table 3 column {5} then gives 
the total opportunity cost for the curve of 1.4719 (mean 0.0368) - indicating the extra 
cost involved in using the pooled curve instead of the unpooled curve.  Therefore, in 
this case, when constructing an empirical Raftery Curve for a future small cfa contract 
it will be better use the unpooled data than to pool all the data. 
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ALTERNATIVE POOLINGS 
 
The example so far has compared the unpooled small cfa dataset with the fully pooled 
cfa dataset.  This is easily extended to other comparisons, in fact all combinations of 
subsets.  For the cfa example, this involves a total of four such combinations - small 
only, small-medium, small-large and small-medium-large.  Table 5 summarises the 
results for the small cfa contracts.  Obviously, for the small cfa subset, the analysis is 
just comparing subset 1 with itself and there can be no change in opportunity cost.  
The result for the all combined subsets 1, 2 and 3 is identical to Table 3, with a mean 
opportunity cost of 0.0368.  For the other poolings, the least opportunity cost is 
provided by the small-large pooling, (mean 0.0243) followed by the small-medium 
pooling (mean 0.0308).  Thus, the best curve to use for a future small cfa contract 
with these data is the unpooled curve. 
 
The same approach can be used for any other characteristic of the future contract (1) 
that is known in advance and (2) for which historical data is available.  Table 6 
summarises the results of a few of these for the Hong Kong dataset.  For the 
remaining cfa categories, the analysis indicates that the large cfa contracts should be 
pooled (-0.0006 mean opportunity cost) but the medium cfa contracts should not be 
pooled.  For the various construction types, type 1, 4, 5 and 7 are recommended not to 
be pooled, while type 3 contracts are recommended to be pooled with types 1, 2 and 7 
(-0.0098 mean opportunity cost); type 8 contracts pooled with types 1, 2 and 6  (-
0.0006 mean opportunity cost); and type 9 contracts pooled with type 3 contracts (-
0.0354 mean opportunity cost).  The groups, number of bids, nature and estimate 
value results are all interpreted the same way. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has proposed a purely empirical method for constructing Raftery Curves 
for tender price forecasting and shown how this can be used to decide on an 
appropriate data pooling scheme.  There are some difficulties, however, that need to 
be address.  In summary these are: 
 
1. The probability values, and linear interpolations, for the unpooled curve are 
assumed to be exact.  This is clearly not the case with finite sample sizes.  To 
illustrate the point, consider the situation where an unbiased die is thrown once 
and its value, say six, is recorded.  Now the purely empirical probability of getting 
a six is unity, which cannot be correct as the true probability must surely be one 
sixth.  By throwing the die many more times the empirical probability is going to 
close asymptotically on the true value but two are unlikely to coincide for a very 
long time.  As a method of deciding subset-pooling arrangements, therefore, it is 
biased in favour of the unpooled subset. 
 
2. As the data tends to be sigmoidal, the frequency distribution tails are long and 
therefore more error prone.  Averaging errors over the whole curve therefore can 
be misleading as the results can be biased by one poor tail observation.  One 
possible solution to this would be to restrict the averaging to a range of 
probabilities, say 0.05 to 0.10, within the tails.  This may well suit the 
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requirements of the curve user too, as the interest is likely to focus on a small 
threshold range of probabilities such as these. 
 
3. The method is described in univariate form.  Although the method in theory can 
be extended to subgroup interactions, eg., small industrial buildings or low valued 
buildings with a small number of tenderers, by physically splitting the data 
accordingly, to do so would involve a rather large computation load and this, 
together with the inbuilt bias towards unpooled samples, suggests against further 
complication. 
 
4. It is assumed that no other variables have a significant effect.  For example, the 
data is assumed to be static, ie., it is assumed that no changes take place over time.  
This can, of course, be corrected by adding in whatever other significant predictor 
variables exist - providing they are known and measurable. 
 
5. The error in predicting ratios is assumed to a suitable proxy for opportunity cost.  
It is also assumed to be symmetrical and linear.  This can easily be tested 
empirically. 
 
Clearly some form of smoothing should help ameliorate the difficulties in 1 and 2.  
The use of  parametric methods, instead of the nonparametric method used here, 
offers one way of doing this and should also help with 3 and 4.  This will involve 
some different assumptions though, particularly concerning the appropriate pdf to use.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF HONG KONG DATASET 
 
The analysis is based on a sample of 229 projects with 3,285 bids received over the 
period from the fourth quarter of 1990 to the third quarter of 1996.  The sample was 
derived from HKSAR Government Architectural Services Department (ASD).  
Projects awarded through selective tendering (where the number of competitors is an 
administrative decision rather than a consequence of market conditions) have been 
excluded.  The bid value was calculated as the original bid value x 885 (TPI as at the 
fourth quarter of 1996), the TPI at tender opening date.  Other details were also 
recorded for each project.  Where not naturally grouped already, these were placed 
into roughly the same size groups of 'small', 'medium' and 'large' for analysis as shown 
below. 
 
Nature of Work: 
    1 = New works 
    2 = Alteration works 
    3 = Maintenance works 
 
Groups invited to tender: 
The Government uses open tendering for the vast majority of  its projects.  For those 
projects that are large and/or complex, the Government uses selective tendering.  The 
Hong Kong SAR Government maintains two lists of approved contractors.  These are 
split into local and overseas.  The local list is subdivided into three classes of 
contractor i.e. (1) Class A local contractors who can bid for small projects up to 
around HK $15 million, (2) Class B local contractors who can bid for small and 
medium projects up to around HK$50 million, (3) Class C local contractors who can 
bid for small, medium and large projects of unlimited value.  The overseas contractors 
are listed separately on List II.  They can only bid for large projects over $50 million.  
Newly listed contractors need to go serve a probationary period.  An explanation of 
the groups invited to tender coding is as follows:  
1 = A and above.  This means that Class A, B and C local contractors can bid for the 
job  
2 = A (excluding probationary status) and above 
3 = B and above.  This means that Class B and C local contractors can bid for the job 
4 = B (excluding probationary status) and above  
5 = C and above.  This means that only Class C contractors can bid for the job. 
6 = C (excluding probationary status)  
7 = List II.  This means that only overseas contractors can bid for the job. 
8 = A (excluding probationary status) and Above and List II 
9 = B and Above and List II 
10 = B (excluding probationary status) and Above  and List II 
11 = C and List II 
12 = C (excluding probationary status) and List II 
13 = All listed tenderers 
14 = Prequalified tenderers .  This essentially means that selective has been used. 
 
 
Number of bidders. 
Small = less than 9 bidders 
Medium = 9 to 15 bidders 
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Large = over 15 bidders 
 
 
Estimate value 
Small = less than HK$45,367,000 
Medium = HK$45,567,00 to HK$100,368,000 
Large = over HK$100,368,000 
 
 
Construction type 
1 = Utilities and civil engineering facilities 
2 = Industrial facilities 
3 = Administrative and commercial facilities 
4 = Health and welfare facilities 
5 = Recreational facilities 
6 = Religious facilities 
7 = Educational, scientific and information facilities 
8 = Residential facilities 
9 = Other facilities 
 
 
Floor area 
This refers to new works projects only.  Hong Kong uses construction floor area 
(CFA) rather than gross floor area (GFA).  CFA is measured to the outside face of the 
column. 
Small = less than 4860 m2 
Medium = 4860 m2 to 10658m2 
Large = over 10658m2 
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CAPTIONS: 
 
Fig 1: Cumulative frequency of small cfa contracts 
Fig 2: Probability values 
Fig 3: Probability values 
Fig 4: Cfa probabilities 
 
Table 1: Results for small cfa contracts subset only 
Table 2: Results for all cfa subsets 
Table 3: Comparison of the two poolings 
Table 4: Summary of poolings 
Table 5: Summary of comparisons for small cfa contracts 
Table 6: Best poolings 
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Fig 1: Cumulative frequency of small cfa contracts
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Fig 2: Probability values
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Fig 3: Probability values
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Fig 4: Cfa probabilities
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Table 1: Results for small cfa contracts subset only 
 
Contract R  p  XRˆ  XRR ˆ−  XRR ˆ−  
2 0.7842 0.0125 0.8446 -0.0603 0.0603 
6 0.8466 0.0375 0.9218 -0.0752 0.0752 
13 0.9271 0.0625 0.9488 -0.0216 0.0216 
18 0.9556 0.0875 0.9853 -0.0297 0.0297 
32 0.9908 0.1125 0.9896 0.0013 0.0013 
35 0.9939 0.1375 1.0037 -0.0099 0.0099 
48 1.0058 0.1625 1.0046 0.0011 0.0011 
50 1.0067 0.1875 1.0306 -0.0238 0.0238 
76 1.0363 0.2125 1.0313 0.0049 0.0049 
77 1.0380 0.2375 1.0436 -0.0056 0.0056 
81 1.0459 0.2625 1.0505 -0.0046 0.0046 
92 1.0549 0.2875 1.0573 -0.0024 0.0024 
99 1.0619 0.3125 1.0603 0.0016 0.0016 
102 1.0628 0.3375 1.0648 -0.0021 0.0021 
106 1.0663 0.3625 1.0706 -0.0043 0.0043 
114 1.0751 0.3875 1.0833 -0.0082 0.0082 
130 1.0940 0.4125 1.0915 0.0025 0.0025 
138 1.1030 0.4375 1.1199 -0.0169 0.0169 
161 1.1401 0.4625 1.1296 0.0105 0.0105 
169 1.1524 0.4875 1.1472 0.0052 0.0052 
171 1.1540 0.5125 1.1615 -0.0074 0.0074 
177 1.1711 0.5375 1.1633 0.0077 0.0077 
180 1.1741 0.5625 1.1725 0.0016 0.0016 
181 1.1744 0.5875 1.1780 -0.0036 0.0036 
186 1.1835 0.6125 1.1806 0.0030 0.0030 
188 1.1903 0.6375 1.1963 -0.0059 0.0059 
201 1.2186 0.6625 1.2052 0.0134 0.0134 
212 1.2345 0.6875 1.2237 0.0109 0.0109 
213 1.2348 0.7125 1.2349 -0.0002 0.0002 
214 1.2358 0.7375 1.2375 -0.0017 0.0017 
218 1.2454 0.7625 1.2392 0.0062 0.0062 
220 1.2500 0.7875 1.2522 -0.0022 0.0022 
224 1.2773 0.8125 1.2553 0.0220 0.0220 
225 1.2783 0.8375 1.2799 -0.0016 0.0016 
230 1.2931 0.8625 1.2805 0.0126 0.0126 
232 1.2938 0.8875 1.3012 -0.0074 0.0074 
242 1.3650 0.9125 1.3010 0.0640 0.0640 
245 1.3766 0.9375 1.3689 0.0077 0.0077 
249 1.4278 0.9625 1.3879 0.0399 0.0399 
257 1.6767 0.9875 1.4291 0.2476 0.2476 
Total 45.8966 20.0000 45.7274 0.1692 0.7583 
Mean 1.1474 0.5000 1.1432 0.0042 0.0190 
SD 0.1648 0.2923 0.1328 0.0451 0.0411 
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Table 2: Results for all cfa subsets 
 
 
Contract R  p  XRˆ  XRR ˆ−  XRR ˆ−  
2 0.7842 0.0041 0.7919 -0.0077 0.0077 
6 0.8466 0.0289 0.9122 -0.0656 0.0656 
13 0.9271 0.0620 0.9536 -0.0265 0.0265 
18 0.9556 0.0702 0.9557 -0.0001 0.0001 
32 0.9908 0.1198 0.9908 0.0000 0.0000 
35 0.9939 0.1446 0.9940 -0.0001 0.0001 
48 1.0058 0.2025 1.0050 0.0007 0.0007 
50 1.0067 0.2190 1.0073 -0.0006 0.0006 
76 1.0363 0.3182 1.0339 0.0024 0.0024 
77 1.0380 0.3264 1.0428 -0.0048 0.0048 
81 1.0459 0.3347 1.0453 0.0006 0.0006 
92 1.0549 0.3595 1.0559 -0.0010 0.0010 
99 1.0619 0.3760 1.0607 0.0012 0.0012 
102 1.0628 0.3926 1.0631 -0.0003 0.0003 
106 1.0663 0.4091 1.0660 0.0004 0.0004 
114 1.0751 0.4587 1.0780 -0.0029 0.0029 
130 1.0940 0.5083 1.0977 -0.0037 0.0037 
138 1.1030 0.5248 1.1028 0.0002 0.0002 
161 1.1401 0.5992 1.1314 0.0087 0.0087 
169 1.1524 0.6240 1.1469 0.0055 0.0055 
171 1.1540 0.6405 1.1547 -0.0006 0.0006 
177 1.1711 0.6653 1.1700 0.0011 0.0011 
180 1.1741 0.6818 1.1730 0.0011 0.0011 
181 1.1744 0.6901 1.1754 -0.0010 0.0010 
186 1.1835 0.7149 1.1825 0.0010 0.0010 
188 1.1903 0.7314 1.1879 0.0024 0.0024 
201 1.2186 0.7810 1.2167 0.0020 0.0020 
212 1.2345 0.8306 1.2330 0.0016 0.0016 
213 1.2348 0.8388 1.2347 0.0000 0.0000 
214 1.2358 0.8471 1.2364 -0.0005 0.0005 
218 1.2454 0.8554 1.2379 0.0075 0.0075 
220 1.2500 0.8636 1.2474 0.0026 0.0026 
224 1.2773 0.8802 1.2627 0.0146 0.0146 
225 1.2783 0.8884 1.2778 0.0006 0.0006 
230 1.2931 0.9132 1.2840 0.0090 0.0090 
232 1.2938 0.9215 1.2935 0.0003 0.0003 
242 1.3650 0.9628 1.3224 0.0426 0.0426 
245 1.3766 0.9711 1.3668 0.0098 0.0098 
249 1.4278 0.9793 1.3795 0.0483 0.0483 
257 1.6767 0.9959 1.5172 0.1595 0.1595 
Total 45.8966 22.7355 45.6885 0.2081 0.4390 
Mean 1.1474 0.5684 1.1422 0.0052 0.0110 
SD 0.1648 0.3089 0.1438 0.0296 0.0279 
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Table 3: Comparison of the two poolings 
 
 
 
Contract 
{1} 
 
R  
{2} 
XRR ˆ− -
XRR ˆ−  
{3} 
)2()1(ˆ pR  
{4} 
Abs diff 
}3{}1{ −  
{5} 
Sum 
{4}+{2} 
2 0.7842 -0.0527 0.7425 0.0417 -0.0109 
6 0.8466 -0.0096 0.8252 0.0214 0.0118 
13 0.9271 0.0048 0.9255 0.0017 0.0065 
18 0.9556 -0.0296 0.9359 0.0196 -0.0099 
32 0.9908 -0.0013 0.9917 0.0009 -0.0004 
35 0.9939 -0.0098 0.9973 0.0034 -0.0064 
48 1.0058 -0.0004 1.0244 0.0187 0.0183 
50 1.0067 -0.0233 1.0367 0.0300 0.0067 
76 1.0363 -0.0025 1.0621 0.0258 0.0233 
77 1.0380 -0.0009 1.0624 0.0244 0.0235 
81 1.0459 -0.0039 1.0627 0.0168 0.0128 
92 1.0549 -0.0014 1.0659 0.0110 0.0096 
99 1.0619 -0.0004 1.0711 0.0092 0.0088 
102 1.0628 -0.0018 1.0790 0.0162 0.0144 
106 1.0663 -0.0040 1.0914 0.0251 0.0212 
114 1.0751 -0.0053 1.1344 0.0593 0.0540 
130 1.0940 0.0012 1.1538 0.0597 0.0609 
138 1.1030 -0.0167 1.1624 0.0594 0.0427 
161 1.1401 -0.0019 1.1787 0.0386 0.0367 
169 1.1524 0.0004 1.1867 0.0343 0.0346 
171 1.1540 -0.0068 1.1937 0.0397 0.0328 
177 1.1711 -0.0067 1.2204 0.0493 0.0427 
180 1.1741 -0.0005 1.2309 0.0568 0.0563 
181 1.1744 -0.0026 1.2346 0.0602 0.0576 
186 1.1835 -0.0020 1.2349 0.0513 0.0494 
188 1.1903 -0.0035 1.2356 0.0452 0.0417 
201 1.2186 -0.0114 1.2488 0.0302 0.0187 
212 1.2345 -0.0093 1.2781 0.0435 0.0342 
213 1.2348 -0.0001 1.2791 0.0444 0.0442 
214 1.2358 -0.0012 1.2840 0.0482 0.0470 
218 1.2454 0.0013 1.2889 0.0435 0.0448 
220 1.2500 0.0004 1.2931 0.0431 0.0435 
224 1.2773 -0.0074 1.2936 0.0162 0.0088 
225 1.2783 -0.0010 1.2964 0.0181 0.0171 
230 1.2931 -0.0036 1.3653 0.0723 0.0687 
232 1.2938 -0.0071 1.3692 0.0754 0.0683 
242 1.3650 -0.0214 1.4309 0.0659 0.0445 
245 1.3766 0.0021 1.5132 0.1365 0.1386 
249 1.4278 0.0084 1.5954 0.1677 0.1760 
257 1.6767 -0.0881 1.8433 0.1666 0.0785 
Total 45.8966 -0.3193 47.5189 1.7912 1.4719 
Mean 1.1474 -0.0080 1.1880 0.0448 0.0368 
SD 0.1648 0.0168 0.2023 0.0380 0.0362 
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Table 4: Summary of poolings 
 
  
Pooling R  p  XRˆ  XRR ˆ−  XRR ˆ−  
1      
Total 45.8966 20.0000 45.7274 0.1692 0.7583
Mean 1.1474 0.5000 1.1432 0.0042 0.0190
SD 0.1648 0.2923 0.1328 0.0451 0.0411
1 2   
Total 45.8966 22.7160 45.6816 0.2150 0.4585
Mean 1.1474 0.5679 1.1420 0.0054 0.0115
SD 0.1648 0.3085 0.1438 0.0295 0.0277
1 3   
Total 45.8966 21.3875 45.6301 0.2665 0.6115
Mean 1.1474 0.5347 1.1408 0.0067 0.0153
SD 0.1648 0.3011 0.1364 0.0429 0.0406
1 2 3   
Total 45.8966 22.7355 45.6885 0.2081 0.4390
Mean 1.1474 0.5684 1.1422 0.0052 0.0110
SD 0.1648 0.3089 0.1438 0.0296 0.0279
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary of comparisons for small cfa contracts 
 
Contract {1} 
 
R  
{2} 
XRR ˆ− -
XRR ˆ−  
{3} 
)2()1(ˆ pR  
{4} 
Abs diff 
}3{}1{ −  
{5} 
Sum 
{4}+{2} 
Small      
Total 45.8966 0.0000 45.8966 0.0000 0.0000
Mean 1.1474 0.0000 1.1474 0.0000 0.0000
SD 0.1648 0.0000 0.1648 0.0000 0.0000
Small-
medium 
  
Total 45.8966 -0.2998 47.2185 1.5307 1.2309
Mean 1.1474 -0.0075 1.1805 0.0383 0.0308
SD 0.1648 0.0170 0.1901 0.0239 0.0236
Small-
large 
  
Total 45.8966 -0.1467 46.9064 1.1194 0.9726
Mean 1.1474 -0.0037 1.1727 0.0280 0.0243
SD 0.1648 0.0077 0.1946 0.0365 0.0383
Small-
medium-
large 
  
Total 45.8966 -0.3193 47.5189 1.7912 1.4719
Mean 1.1474 -0.0080 1.1880 0.0448 0.0368
SD 0.1648 0.0168 0.2023 0.0380 0.0362
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Table 6: Best poolings 
 
Ratio Subset 
N Mean Sd
Best pooling 
OC vs 
single 
subset 
Construction type      
1 13 1.1855 0.2290 1 0.0000
2 1 1.2783 - - -
3 52 1.1242 0.1610 1 2 3 7 -0.0098
4 27 1.1587 0.2097 4 0.0000
5 70 1.1194 0.1447 5 0.0000
6 1 1.1981 - - -
7 79 1.1042 0.1423 7 0.0000
8 11 1.1639 0.0821 1 2 6 8 -0.0006
9 5 1.0375 0.1172 3 9 -0.0354
Total 259 1.1244 0.1580  
Group   
1 8 1.0194 0.1840 1 0.0000
2 0 - - - -
3 121 1.1327 0.1540 3 0.0000
4 4 1.1321 0.0662 4 5 9 12 -0.0149
5 1 1.0151 - - -
6 0 - - - -
7 0 - - - -
8 1 1.0912 - - -
9 6 1.1248 0.0885 1 3 4 9 -0.0063
10 8 1.1241 0.1041 3 4 9 10 13 -0.0119
11 68 1.0884 0.1100 11 0.0000
12 4 1.0949 0.0858 4 8 11 12 -0.0556
13 8 1.3932 0.3759 13 0.0000
14 30 1.1181 0.1406 1 3 8 9 11-14 -0.0040
15 0 - -  -
Total 259 1.1244 0.1580  
Number of bids   
1 Small 87 1.0902 0.1468 1 0.0000
2 Medium 80 1.1326 0.1622 2 0.0000
3 Large 92 1.1496 0.1604 1 3 0.0000
Total 259 1.1244 0.1580  
Nature   
1 200 1.1273 0.1490 1 0.0000
2 58 1.1169 0.1871 2 0.0000
3 1 0.9806 - - -
Total 259 1.1244 0.1580  
CFA   
1 Small 40 1.1474 0.1648 1 0.0000
2 Medium 41 1.0845 0.1193 2 0.0000
3 Large 40 1.1058 0.1206 1-3 -0.0006
Total 121 1.1123 0.1378  
Estimate   
1 Small 90 1.1557 0.1792 1 0.0000
2 Medium 91 1.1000 0.1173 2 0.0000
3 Large 78 1.1171 0.1689 3 0.0000
Total 259 1.1244 0.1580  
 
